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CAPABILITIES(7) Linux Programmer's Manual CAPABILITIES(7)
NAME
capabilities - overview of Linux capabilities
DESCRIPTION
For the purpose of performing permission checks, traditional Unix
implementations distinguish two categories of processes: privileged
processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred to as superuser or
root), and unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is non-zero).
Privileged processes bypass all kernel permission checks, while unpriv-
ileged processes are subject to full permission checking based on the
process's credentials (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and sup-
plementary group list).
Starting with kernel 2.2, Linux divides the privileges traditionally
associated with superuser into distinct units, known as capabilities,
which can be independently enabled and disabled.
Capabilities List
As at Linux 2.6.14, the following capabilities are implemented:
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (since Linux 2.6.11)
Enable and disable kernel auditing; change auditing filter
rules; retrieve auditing status and filtering rules.
CAP_AUDIT_WRITE (since Linux 2.6.11)
Allow records to be written to kernel auditing log.
CAP_CHOWN
Allow arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see chown(2)).
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks. (DAC =
"discretionary access control".)
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
Bypass file read permission checks and directory read and exe-
cute permission checks.
CAP_FOWNER
Bypass permission checks on operations that normally require the
file system UID of the process to match the UID of the file
(e.g., chmod(2), utime(2)), excluding those operations covered
by the CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH; set extended
file attributes (see chattr(1)) on arbitrary files; set Access
Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files; ignore directory sticky
bit on file deletion; specify O_NOATIME for arbitrary files in
open(2) and fcntl(2).
CAP_FSETID
Don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits when a file is
modified; permit setting of the set-group-ID bit for a file
whose GID does not match the file system or any of the supple-
mentary GIDs of the calling process.
CAP_IPC_LOCK
Permit memory locking (mlock(2), mlockall(2), mmap(2), shm
ctl(2)).
CAP_IPC_OWNER
Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC objects.
CAP_KILL
Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see kill(2)).
This includes use of the KDSIGACCEPT ioctl.
CAP_LEASE
(Linux 2.4 onwards) Allow file leases to be established on
arbitrary files (see fcntl(2)).
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
Allow setting of the EXT2_APPEND_FL and EXT2_IMMUTABLE_FL
extended file attributes (see chattr(1)).
CAP_MKNOD
(Linux 2.4 onwards) Allow creation of special files using
mknod(2).
CAP_NET_ADMIN
Allow various network-related operations (e.g., setting privi-
leged socket options, enabling multicasting, interface configu-
ration, modifying routing tables).
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
Allow binding to Internet domain reserved socket ports (port
numbers less than 1024).
CAP_NET_BROADCAST
(Unused) Allow socket broadcasting, and listening multicasts.
CAP_NET_RAW
Permit use of RAW and PACKET sockets.
CAP_SETGID
Allow arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary
GID list; allow forged GID when passing socket credentials via
Unix domain sockets.
CAP_SETPCAP
Grant or remove any capability in the caller's permitted capa-
bility set to or from any other process.
CAP_SETUID
Allow arbitrary manipulations of process UIDs (setuid(2),
setreuid(2), setresuid(2), setfsuid(2)); allow forged UID when
passing socket credentials via Unix domain sockets.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Permit a range of system administration operations including:
quotactl(2), mount(2), umount(2), swapon(2), swapoff(2),
sethostname(2), setdomainname(2), IPC_SET and IPC_RMID opera-
tions on arbitrary System V IPC objects; perform operations on
trusted and security Extended Attributes (see attr(5)); call
lookup_dcookie(2); perform keyctl(2) KEYCTL_CHOWN and
KEYCTL_SETPERM operations. allow forged UID when passing socket
credentials; exceed /proc/sys/fs/file-max, the system-wide limit
on the number of open files, in system calls that open files
(e.g., accept(2), execve(2), open(2), pipe(2); without this
capability these system calls will fail with the error ENFILE if
this limit is encountered).
CAP_SYS_BOOT
Permit calls to reboot(2) and kexec_load(2).
CAP_SYS_CHROOT
Permit calls to chroot(2).
CAP_SYS_MODULE
Allow loading and unloading of kernel modules; allow modifica-
tions to capability bounding set (see init_module(2) and
delete_module(2)).
CAP_SYS_NICE
Allow raising process nice value (nice(2), setpriority(2)) and
changing of the nice value for arbitrary processes; allow
setting of real-time scheduling policies for calling process,
and setting scheduling policies and priorities for arbitrary
processes (sched_setscheduler(2), sched_setparam(2)); set CPU
affinity for arbitrary processes (sched_setaffinity()); use the
MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL with mbind(2).
CAP_SYS_PACCT
Permit calls to acct(2).
CAP_SYS_PTRACE
Allow arbitrary processes to be traced using ptrace(2)
CAP_SYS_RAWIO
Permit I/O port operations (iopl(2) and ioperm(2)); access
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
Permit: use of reserved space on ext2 file systems; ioctl(2)
calls controlling ext3 journaling; disk quota limits to be over-
ridden; resource limits to be increased (see setrlimit(2));
RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit to be overridden; msg_qbytes limit
for a message queue to be raised above the limit in
/proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb (see msgop(2) and msgctl(2).
CAP_SYS_TIME
Allow modification of system clock (settimeofday(2), stime(2),
adjtimex(2)); allow modification of real-time (hardware) clock
CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
Permit calls to vhangup(2).
Process Capabilities
Each process has three capability sets containing zero or more of the
above capabilities:
Effective:
the capabilities used by the kernel to perform permission checks
for the process.
Permitted:
the capabilities that the process may assume (i.e., a limiting
superset for the effective and inheritable sets). If a process
drops a capability from its permitted set, it can never re-
acquire that capability (unless it exec()s a set-user-ID-root
program).
inheritable:
the capabilities preserved across an execve(2).
A child created via fork(2) inherits copies of its parent's capability
sets. See below for a discussion of the treatment of capabilities dur-
ing exec().
Using capset(2), a process may manipulate its own capability sets, or,
if it has the CAP_SETPCAP capability, those of another process.
Capability bounding set
When a program is execed, the permitted and effective capabilities are
ANDed with the current value of the so-called capability bounding set,
defined in the file /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound. This parameter can be
used to place a system-wide limit on the capabilities granted to all
subsequently executed programs. (Confusingly, this bit mask parameter
is expressed as a signed decimal number in /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound.)
Only the init process may set bits in the capability bounding set;
other than that, the superuser may only clear bits in this set.
On a standard system the capability bounding set always masks out the
CAP_SETPCAP capability. To remove this restriction (dangerous!), mod-
ify the definition of CAP_INIT_EFF_SET in include/linux/capability.h
and rebuild the kernel.
The capability bounding set feature was added to Linux starting with
kernel version 2.2.11.
Current and Future Implementation
A full implementation of capabilities requires:
1. that for all privileged operations, the kernel check whether the
process has the required capability in its effective set.
2. that the kernel provide system calls allowing a process's capabil-
ity sets to be changed and retrieved.
3. file system support for attaching capabilities to an executable
file, so that a process gains those capabilities when the file is
execed.
As at Linux 2.6.14, only the first two of these requirements are met.
Eventually, it should be possible to associate three capability sets
with an executable file, which, in conjunction with the capability sets
of the process, will determine the capabilities of a process after an
exec():
Inheritable (formerly known as allowed):
this set is ANDed with the process's inheritable set to deter-
mine which inheritable capabilities are permitted to the process
after the exec().
Permitted (formerly known as forced):
the capabilities automatically permitted to the process, regard-
less of the process's inheritable capabilities.
Effective:
those capabilities in the process's new permitted set are also
to be set in the new effective set. (F(effective) would nor-
mally be either all zeroes or all ones.)
In the meantime, since the current implementation does not support file
capability sets, during an exec():
1. All three file capability sets are initially assumed to be cleared.
2. If a set-user-ID-root program is being execed, or the real user ID
of the process is 0 (root) then the file inheritable and permitted
sets are defined to be all ones (i.e., all capabilities enabled).
3. If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed, then the file
effective set is defined to be all ones.
Transformation of Process Capabilities During exec()
During an exec(), the kernel calculates the new capabilities of the
process using the following algorithm:
P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
(F(permitted) & cap_bset)
P'(effective) = P'(permitted) & F(effective)
P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable) [i.e., unchanged]
where:
P denotes the value of a process capability set before the
exec()
P' denotes the value of a capability set after the exec()
F denotes a file capability set
cap_bset is the value of the capability bounding set.
In the current implementation, the upshot of this algorithm is that
when a process exec()s a set-user-ID-root program, or when a process
with an effective UID of 0 exec()s a program, it gains all capabilities
in its permitted and effective capability sets, except those masked out
by the capability bounding set (i.e., CAP_SETPCAP). This provides
semantics that are the same as those provided by traditional Unix sys-
tems.
Effect of User ID Changes on Capabilities
To preserve the traditional semantics for transitions between 0 and
non-zero user IDs, the kernel makes the following changes to a pro-
cess's capability sets on changes to the process's real, effective,
saved set, and file system user IDs (using setuid(2), setresuid(2), or
similar):
1. If one or more of the real, effective or saved set user IDs was
previously 0, and as a result of the UID changes all of these IDs
have a non-zero value, then all capabilities are cleared from the
permitted and effective capability sets.
2. If the effective user ID is changed from 0 to non-zero, then all
capabilities are cleared from the effective set.
3. If the effective user ID is changed from non-zero to 0, then the
permitted set is copied to the effective set.
4. If the file system user ID is changed from 0 to non-zero (see setf
suid(2)) then the following capabilities are cleared from the
effective set: CAP_CHOWN, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
CAP_FOWNER, and CAP_FSETID. If the file system UID is changed from
non-zero to 0, then any of these capabilities that are enabled in
the permitted set are enabled in the effective set.
If a process that has a 0 value for one or more of its user IDs wants
to prevent its permitted capability set being cleared when it resets
all of its user IDs to non-zero values, it can do so using the prctl()
PR_SET_KEEPCAPS operation.
NOTES
The libcap package provides a suite of routines for setting and getting
process capabilities that is more comfortable and less likely to change
than the interface provided by capset(2) and capget(2).
CONFORMING TO
No standards govern capabilities, but the Linux capability implementa-
tion is based on the withdrawn POSIX 1003.1e draft standard.
BUGS
There is as yet no file system support allowing capabilities to be
associated with executable files.
SEE ALSO
capget(2), prctl(2), setfsuid(2)
Linux 2.6.14 2005-10-28 CAPABILITIES(7)
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This page was generated on Tue Feb 13 02:22:24 GMT 2007
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